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FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RIOHl.VIOND 
RORER A. JAMES, JR. 
vs. 
ALLEN H. POWELL 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
To the Ilonorable Justices of the Supreme Oou1·t of Appeals: 
STATEMENT OF FAOTS 
This was an action at law by way. of motion for judgment of 
Allen H. Powell against Rorer A. James, Jr., in the Oircuit Court 
of Franklin Oounty, for libel at common law and under the Stat-
ute of insulting words for the publication in the Danyille Bee 
and the Dan \"ille Register, of two newspaper articles~ dated re-
spectively, November 18, 1927, and February 11, 1928.· The_ Dan-
ville Register and Bee are owned and published by Rorer A. 
James, Jr., Defendant below, Appeilant here, such o\\;nership' 
being alleged in the notice arld not denied under oath, and also 
such ownership being admitted by Rorer A. James, Jr. (See 
page 56 of the record.) · 
On the 13th day of November, 1927~ Z. T. Wade, a Justic~ o~ 
the Peace of ~,ranklin Oounty, issued a criminal warrant for the 
arrest of Ben F. Perdue and A. H. Powell (Appellee) on the 
charge that on the 13th day of November, 1927, they "did un-
lawfully, maliciously and wilfully shoot, kill and murder a cer-
tain person whose name is unknO\vn." It will be observe.d that 
this was a joint charge. On the 13th day of November, A. H. 
Powell and Ben F. Perdue were arraigned. before said ma'giatrate 
and waiving preliminary trial they were recognized to appear be-
fore the Oircuit Oourt of Franklin Oounty .on November 15, 1927, 
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and gave bond or bail for their appearance. ·(see record, pp. 50 
and 51.) 
On the 14th day of November, 1927. the grand jury of the said 
Commonwealth found a joint indictment against Ben F. Perdue 
and A. H. Powell charging that they on Novem her 13th, 1927, 
uthe said Ooley T. Godfrey feloniously, wilfully and of their 
malice aforethought, did kill and murder, etc." (See pages 51 
and 52 of the record.) 
There was no charge in the warrant or indictment, nor was it 
at any time claimed by the Oommonwealth that the said Godfrey 
was killed by Allen H. Powell and Perdue for the purpose of 
robbery, or with robbery as a motive. On February lOth, 1928, 
said A. H. Powell and B. F. Perdue were put on trial in the Oir-
cuit Oourt of Franklin Oounty to answer the charges of the in-
dictment above set out and the defendants ha\"ing severed Ben 
F. Perdue was put on trial and was found not guilty. 1'hereupon, 
the charges being identical and the evidence and contention of 
the Commonwealth identical in both cases, the court ruled, and 
the Commonwealth consenting, the jury found a similar verdict 
of not guilty as to A. B. Powell. · 
On November 18, 1927, the article set forth on page 49 of the 
record appeared in the Danville Bee. So far as is necessary here 
to quote, this article was as follows: (Italics supplied) 
"Rocky Mount, Va., November 18.-An unsual situation de-
veloped here today in regard to the murder of Ooley T. Godfrey, 
wl10se body was found near here several days ago, and as a result 
of which Ben F. Perdue and A. H. Powell, State Prohibition 
Agents, are charged with fi'l·st deg1·ee mu'l·de1' und 'J'obbeT1f· 
HOonsiderable feeling is apparent over the shooting, while 
Godfrey was not known here, the evidence in the hands of John 
Lee, Oomwonwealtlt's Attorney of the Oount1t, tending to show a 
O'l'utal mu1•der fm• the pu1•pose of robber?/, and the effort to ex-
change the circumstances, making it appear that Godfrey at-
tacked the officers and that they shot in self-defense has come as 
a startling revelation in methods of prohibition enforcement." 
On February lOth the following article appeared in the Dan-
ville Register: (Italics supplied.) 
"Rocky Mount, Va., February 10.-Ben F. Perdue, former 
Franklin Oounty officer, charged with the murder of Ooley God-
frey, Roanoke picture frame agent, on November 13, was found 
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'not guilty' by a jury in the Franklin Oounty Oourt here at 6 :15 
o'clock this afternoon, after twenty-five minutes of,deliberation. 
The verdict of acquittal a~ttornatically clears A. H. Powe1I,jointly 
charged with the killing. Judge Dillard ruled that as the evi-
dence in bot!L cases was identical, that it would not be necessary 
to try Powell. The Commonwealth contending that Godfrey was 
s/wt witlL 1J•obbe1·y as the motive." 
It will be observed that the article in the Bee appeared on 
N ovem her 18, after the warrant had been issued and the indict-
ment found and that the article in the Register, both papers be-
ing owned and published by the Appellant, James, appeared on 
February 10, 1928. On November 15, (see p. 53 of the record), 
an Associated Press dispatch from Rocky Mount, dated Novem-
ber 14, was published in the Danville Register. This report, 
which wa~ substantially correct, showed that Powell and Perdue 
were not charged with robbery, nor of having shot Godfrey in an 
attempt to commit robbery, and this article was introduced in 
evidence to show that at the time of the publication of the special 
to the Bee of November 18th, 1927, and at the time of the publi-
cation of the article in the Register, of ],ebruary lOth, 1928, the 
owner of and publisher of this paper had in his office a true state-
ment of the facts regarding this matter. On motion of the de-
fendant, James, this article was subsequently by the court 
stricken from the record, to which action the plaintiff below ex-
cepted. The theory of the motion and the court's ruling being 
that as no punitive damages were claimed, actual knowledge of 
of the falsity of the account was immaterial. .. In view, however, 
of the fact that appellant now claims that the publication was in 
good faith and excepted to the court's ruling excluding the evi-
dence of Tetley that it was in good faith, attention is here called 
to this article because the defendant below could not blow hot 
and cold on the same proposition and if his motion to exclude 
this article was well taken and the court's ruling thereon correct, 
then of course the court's ruling excluding the evidence of Tetley 
was also correct and the exception of the defendant below was 
for that reason alone not well talten. 
It will be observed, therefore, that the two articles in ques-
tion made the specific charges or accusations against Appellee, 
Powell, as follows: 
1. The article in the Bee of November 18, p. 49 of the record, 
accused Powell that he was Hcharged with first degree murder 
and robbery." 
r 
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2. "That there was evidence in the l1ands of the Common-
wealth's Attorney tending to show brutal murder for the purpose 
of robbery, etc." 
The article in the Register of February lOth, after setting up 
the fact that Perdue had been found "not guilty,'' alleges that 
the evidence in the two cases was identical and that therefore it 
was not necessary to try Powell, and after showing that Powell 
and Perdue were jointly charged with a similar offense, and that 
they merely had been tried separately, states "the Common-
wealth's Attorney contending that Godfrey was shot with rob-
bery as the motive," the article not stating that the Common-
wealth contended that Perdue had shot Godfrey, but that God-
frey was shot, that is, by both defendants, jointly indicted, with 
robbery as a motive, which was of course an allegation or accusa-
tion that it was the contention of the Commonwealth in the 
trial of Perdue, who jointly with Powell, was accused of the of-
fense in question, that both he Perdue, and Powell, had com-
mitted murder with robbery as the motive. This, according to 
plain:understanding of the language used could convey but one 
idea to the reader, to-wit, that the paper stated that it was the 
contention of the Commonwealth that the shooting in question 
had been done by both Powell and Perdue with the purpose of, 
or motive of, robbery. 
Motion for judgment in this case was returnable on the 7th 
day of April-, 1928, and therefore must have been served in the 
"fifteen days prior thereto, and the court order, page 25 of the 
record, shows that it was so served. Therefore, this notice was 
served and this suit was instituted certainly as early as the 23rd 
day of March, 1928, although the record does not show the date of 
the actual service. On February 21, 1928, see page 63 of the 
record, an article appea1·ed in the Danville Bee (not in the Reg-
ister) which the defendant relies upon as an apology. A reading 
of this article will convince the court that it was not au apology 
nor a retraction. It only purports to gi,·e Powell·s side of the of 
the controversy. It states: 
"Messrs. Dillard and Powell took exception to the statements 
appearing in this paper that the State in pressing charges against 
Powell and Perdue claimed robbery as a motive of the murder. 
There was was at no time any suggestion that robbery was the 
motive and that at uo time has there ever been any intimation 
of such a charge. j.Jftr • .Dilla1•d sa118." 
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After the service of 'notice of this suit on defendant on or be-
fore l\farch 23rd, there did appear in the Danville Bee of March 
24th, a retraction and apology. (See pa~e 64 of the record.) 
No apology has ever appeared in the Register for the article of 
February lOth. 
That the article in the Bee was totally untrue in the particu-
lars above set out cannot be. questioned for the following reasons: 
. 1. The apology and retraction made by the Bee on March 24th 
after suit was brought admitted that the charges were untrue; 
2. The defendant never filed any plea of truth and therefore, 
as will be hereafter shown, the charges are conclusively presum-
ed to be false and no evidence thereof was required and, 
3. After the warrant and indictment had been introduced 
showing that there was no charge therein of robbery, the Oom-
monwealth's Attorney, Mr. J. P. Lee, was put on the stand to 
prove that the other charges as to evidence being in the hands 
of the Commonwealth's Attorney tending to show brutal ·murder 
for the purpose of robbery was untrue, ·and the attorney. for· the 
defendant, James, objected to this evidence and stated: "I ob-· 
ject to the question. I have not plead justification of the truth 
of the charges." (See page 55 of the record.} Oounsel for Mr. 
James further said in reply to the following statement froni 
counsel for plaintiff: . 
Q. HI underRtand that counsel for defendant admits that the 
statement contained in the paper as to their being charged with 
robbery, and that the evidence was in the 'bands of the Oommon-! 
wealth's Attorney, they admit that was all false." 
MR. HARRIS: "I admit that was unfortunately incorrect, 
but innocently made." 
OOUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: "You admit it was untrue." 
BY MR. HARRIS: uYes, and so stated over his signature 
time after time, in tlie newspaper at your request." 
BY OOUNSEL FOR PLAINTI~,F: "Then he admits that 
now.'' 
BY THE OOURT: "What is the use of proving it?" 
The evidence in this case therefore shows that the Danville 
Bee and the- Danville Register, both owned and published by 
Rorer James, Jr., published certain articles in which it was 
stated that the plaintiff, Powell, was charged with robbery, or 
with murder with robbery as a motive, charged that the Com-
monwealth ,s Attorney had evidence in his hands tending to 
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show a brutal murder for the purpose of robbery, and further 
charging that at the trial of Perdue, in which the evidence and 
contention of the Commonwealth was the same as to Perdue and 
Powell, that the Oom mon,vealth contended that Godfrey had 
been shot (that is, by Powell and Perdue), with robbery as a mo-
tive. The evidence further shows, and the defendant could not 
deny because he filed no plea of truth, that these charges were 
absolutely without foundation and were solely creatures of some 
person's imagination, and that the publisher of these papers, the 
defendant below, had in his office at the time, facts showing that 
they were untrue. 
PROOEEDINGS 
The motion for judgment was returnable, as stated, on the 7th 
day of April, and on that day, (see page 25 of the record), "the 
defendant appea'red and upon mption of the plaintiff, and with 
the consent of the defendant, he is allowed to file his amended 
notice of motion for judgment and the defendant is given until 
April 16th to file his grounds of defense and pleas, and b11 consent 
of tlte pa'J•tiea by counsel this motion is continued until June 20, 
1928." Pursuant thereto the defendant filed a plea of the gen-
eral issue and as a ground of defense set up that the publications 
set Otlt in the notice of motion were based upon a newspaper report 
of judicial proceedings, were published in good faith, without 
malice, and were therefore privileged. (See page 82 of the ·rec-
ord.) On June the 20th, after a jury was empaneled to try this 
action, the defendant below offered to amend his pleadings to 
show in mitigation of damages an apology published on February 
21, 1928, (this is the alleged apology found on page 68 of the rec-
ord) and the court allowed such amendment but as a condition 
thereto withdrew a juror and continued the case at defendant's 
costs until July 17th. The defendant havi'ng already appearecl 
generally on April 7th and asking leave for time to file its plea 
and having on that date consented to a continuan~e and having 
subsequently on April 16th filed its plea of the general issue and 
grounds of defense of privileged communication and having 
gone to trial on June the 20th on the plea of the general issue 
and such grounds of defense of privileged communication and 
having tendered on that day an additional plea of apology, and 
the cause having been continued and set for trial on July l~t.h .. 
on lille last named date for the first time defendant undertook 
and ofi'ered to file a plea in abatement and a motion which was 
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equivalent to a plea in abatement, which the court refused leave 
to file. 
At such trial the plaintiff and defendant offered instructions 
presenting their theories of the law of th&case, the court adopted 
the plaintiff's theory and gave instructions set out in the record 
which will be hereafter commented on and the jury returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff of $1,100.00, which the court· refused to 
set aside. 
ISSUES OF FAOT 
There were no controversial questions of fact involved in this 
case except as to tlie conversation between Herbert Dillard and 
Allen H. Powell and Rorer A. James, Jr., and certain employees 
of his at the office of the Danville Bee shortly prior to the publi-
cation in the Bee of the alleged apology published therein on 
February 21st. (See page 63 of the record.) It being contended 
by defendant below that this article was prepared by, or approvE;\d 
by Mr. Dillard, and it being the contention of the plaintiff that 
this was not a fact and that the article in question was not satis-
factory nor agreed to by Powell or his 'attorney and that the de-
fendant did not comply with the understanding as to the article 
and the mailing thereof. The jury accepting the view of the 
plaintiff below and the evidence being conflicting, the tnatter is 
of no further importance. 
ARGUMENT 
The issues of law in this case and the determination of the 
correctness of the court's rulings in the reception and rejection of 
evidence and in the granting and refusing of instructions, de-
pends upon certain well settled propositions of law which being 
determined can by their application to the various instructions 
and rulings resolve all of these questions without a detailed ref-
erence to each instruction given and refused. There are two pre-
liminary questions of Jaw in reference to the refusal of the court 
to allow the filing of the plea in abatement or a motion raising 
the question of jurisdiction and the further question as to the 
allegation in Oount No. 1 of the place of publication of the Dan-
ville Bee, which we will first consider s~parately. 
PLEA IN ABATEMENT 
After the defendant had appeared generally on April 7th and 
~onsented to a continuance (record, page 25) and after it had 
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filed its plea of the general issue and grounds of defense (record 
page 32) and after it had filed on J nne 20th, 1928, additional 
grQnnds of defense under its plea of the general issue, (see page 
32 of the record), and g,fter this case had been again set for trial 
as of July 17th, the defendant on July 17th, for the first time, 
tendered a piea in abatement (see page 33 of the record), which 
plea had not in. fact been sworn to until the 16th· day of July, 
1928. On the same day defendant filed what it called a motion 
which attacked the jurisdiction of the court on the same grounds, 
to-wit, that the cause of action in reference to the article of 
November 18th in the Dariville Bee was not published in Frank-
lin Oounty and that therefore the cause of action as to such ar-
ticle did not arise in Franklin Oounty. · 
· As both of·these proceedings, by way of plea in abat~ment and 
by way. of ·motion to dismiss, attack the jurisdiction of the court 
they will be treated and considered together. 
"In no case can dilatory pleas be filed after the defendant has 
demurred, pleaded in bar or answered to the declaration." 
Burk&' Pleading and Practice, pp. 250-251. 
"It is a well established rule that.appearance to the merits of 
the case is a. waiv~r of defects in the process and se'rviee thereo~.'' 
Burks' Pleading and Practice, p. 262 .. 
Section 6105 of the Oode pro~.ide~: 
"Where the declaration ol'· bill shows on its face proper matter 
fot• the jurisdiction of 'the court no exception for want of such ju-
risdiction shall be al.lowed unless it be taken by pleu, in abate-
ment. No such plea, or any other plea in abatement. shull be re-
ceived after the q,efendunt has demurred, pleaded in bar or an-
swered to the declaration or bill." 
Section 4046 of the Oode, relative to motions for judgment, and 
the proceeding here was a notice of motion for judgment, provides: 
"No plea of abatement under this section shall be received 
·after the defendant has demurred, pleaded in bar or filed such 
statement of his grounds of defense." 
·~After defendant has appeared and pleaded to an a~tion by 
way of motion under Section 6046 he cannot move to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction.'' 
Maratock Ins. Oo. v. Pankey, 91 Va., 259. 
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1'he abo\"e case was a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
for the same grounds alleged in the motion in the case at bar 
and having been made after a general appearance the motion 
'vas denied under the authority of Section 6105. See to the same 
effect, Norfolk & Western v. Amprey, 93 Va., 108; Atlantic Ry. 
Oo. v. Peake, 87 Va., 130; James River, etc., Oo. v. Robinson, 
16 Grat, 57 Va., 434-440. 
In the case of Moore v. Norfolk & Western, 124 Vu., 628,which 
was an action of trespass on the case, a conditional judgment had 
been entered at rules and at a subsequent rules the defendant· 
continuing in default an offi~e judgment was entered with an 
order for an inquiry of damages. Thereafter at term the com-
pany appeared specially and filed a motion to dismiss on the 
ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that the caiu~e of action, 
and no part thereof, arose in the county in which the suit was 
pending. The statute provides that no plea in abatement can be-
filed after '~the rules next succeeding the rules at which the dec-. 
laration or bill is filed," just as it provides thut no plea in abate-
ment can be filed after the defendant has demurred, pleaded in 
bar or answered. The court held: 
uThe motion of the company to dismiss was in truth an objec-
tion directed merely against the venue of the action, and came 
in the wrong form and too late, under Section 3260 of the Oode 
of 1904 (6105 of the Oode of 1919) which provides that such an. 
objection cannot be allowed unless taken by plea in abatement 
which could not be filed at the stage of the proceedings at which-
the motion was maue. '' 
In Davis Baking Company v. Dozier, lBJ Va., 628, the derend-· 
ant after demurring and pleading asked leare of the court to 
withdraw the plea and demurrer and for leave to appear specially 
and moved to quash the writ because it showed on its face thnt 
there was no legal service. The court held that the trial court 
did not err in refusing this request as by appearing to the action 
the defendant had waived all defects in the process and in the 
service thereof. And the court says, on page 633, quoting from~ 
New River Mineral Oo. v. Painter, 100 Va., 507: 
"It is a well established rule of practice that by appearing to. 
the action the defendant waived all defe(~ts in the process and in 
the service thereof. The decisions go further and imply such a 
waiver from the defendant's taking or consenting to a continuance 
as fully as they do to his pleading to the actiort. The object of 
the writ is to apprise the defendant of the nature of the proceed-
f' 
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ings against him. His· taking, or agreeing to a continuance, is 
evidence of his having made himself a party to the record and of 
his having recognized the: case as in court. It is too late after-
wards for him to say that he has not been brought regularly into 
court.'' 
In the case of Morgan v. Pa. Rwy. Oo., 148 Va., 272, the de-
fendant was sued in the Oity of Norfolk in an action of trespass 
on the case. At the first October Rules, 1924, the defendant ap-
peared and filed a plea in abatement. This plea was, on Decem-
ber 3, rejected. The defendant then plead the general issue. In 
October, 1~25, the defendant filed another plea to the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
The Oourt of Appeals held that the first plea in abatement was 
bad and sustained .the action of the trial court in striking it out. 
It then proceeded to hold that ha.ving appeared and plead to the 
merits th"at it was too late for the defendant company to there-
after object to the jurisdiction by another plea of abatement and 
held that the defen«lant, a foreign corporation, having made an 
appearance and plead the gener~l issue, waived all defects, if 
any, in the service of process and submitted itself to the juris-
diction of the trial court. 
The distinction between jurisdictiQn and venue. must be kept 
in mind: It is clearly laid down in the case of Moore v. Norfolk 
& Western, 124 Va., 628, and in 1\iorgan v. Pa. Rwy. 148 Va., 
272. In Moore v. Norfolk & Western, it is held: 
u Venue-Jurisdiction. Section 3214, Oode of 1904, provides 
that any action at law may be brought in any county or corpora-
tion wherein ahy of the clefendants·reside. etc. Section 2215 pro-
vides that any action may. be brought in any county or corpora-
tion where the cause of action, or any part thereof, arose. These 
sections of the Oode fix the venue of the action. Ac·curately 
speaking they do-not co'nfer 'jurisdiction' upon any courts. 'l'hey 
concern only the procedure of the courts touching the place of 
trial or the venue of actions. at law or of suits in equity. They 
confer merely a p1•ivilege upon the defendant to have the action 
or suit against him in such a case heard and determined in the 
local courts thereiil specified. But it .is a privilege which may be 
waived and which, if about to be denied, must, in Virginia, be 
claimed by plea in abatement filed in pursuance to Section 3260 
of the Oode of 1904; otherwise, it will be lost, if the court in 
which the action or suit is brought has general jurisdiction of 
snch an action or suit anti has the subject m:t.tter and the proper 
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parties, plaintiff and defendant, before it. 
"Under the Code, Circuit Oourts have original aud general ju-
risdiction over all civil cases at law, and the instant case (being 
an action for personal injuries) being a transitory personal action 
at law, the circuit court had jurisdiction of it rega1·dless of where 
the cause of .action arose, the defendant having been served . 
with process. 
hWhere the proper parties are before a circuit court, then by 
virtue of the statute and the common law its territorial jurisdic-
tion over persons and property is co-extensive with the bounds 
of the whole State, except a~ limited by the venue statutes, sec-
tions 8214 and 3315 of the Code of 1904; and but for such venue 
statutes, if a party defendant be once gotten before such court, 
in a litigation over a subject matter over which the court has 
general jurisdiction, and which subject matter is actually before 
the court, by proper pleading and otherwise, such party would 
have no privilege of demanding that the trial should be had in any 
other court of the State, it matters not when~ the cause of action 
may have arisen or where else in the State the defendant may 
reside. And since the defendant owes to statute law the venue 
pri.vileges given by Sections 8214 and 3215,0ode of 1904, of lim-
iting the said broad territorial jurisdi~tion of the court aforesaid, 
the statute law may attach a condition to the enjoy·ment of such 
privileges; and Section 3260 of the Oode of 190! (Section· 6105 of 
1919) has attached a condition thereto, namely, that such a priv-
ilege must ·be claimed by plea in abatement .. , 
In Morgan v. Pa. Rwy. Co., 148 Va., 272, the court re-affirms 
the above rule, approving Moore v. N.· & W. supra, and holds: 
uSection 6049 of the Code of 1919 providing for the county or 
corporation in which actions at law or suits in eq~ity may be 
brought, does not confer jurisdiction on the courts but simply 
fixes the venue by giving the defendant the p1•ivilege of .having 
his case heard in a particular county or city; and this privilege 
may be waived by him. · 
uSection 6049 gives the defendant the privilege of ha\'ing his 
case heard in a particular county or "city, but-defendant· muBt 
claim tlti8 privilege within the time and in the manner prescribed 
by Section 6105, which provides that no objection for want of 
jurisdiction shall be allowed unless. it be taken by plea in abate-
ment and that no such plea, or ony other plea in abatement, 
shall be received after the defenqa_nt has demurred, pleaded in 
bar or answered to the declaration or bill, nor aft~r the declara-
--------------------
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tion or bill is filed, or the privilege will be lost, if the court has· 
general jurisdiction over such actions and 'bas the subject matter 
and the proper parties before it .. 
~'Where the proper parties are before a circuit court its terri-
torial jurisdiction over persons and property is co-extensive with 
the bounds of the whole State." 
See also Burks' Pleading and Practice, 2nd Ed., p. 270, where 
where the rule is similarly stated. 
As we read appellant's· petition, the unescapable result of the 
statute and decisions above quoted i~ attempted to be avoided 
by two contentions: 
1. That the motion to dismiss, and the amended grounds of 
defense raising a question of jurisdiction, was an amendment to 
the pleadings, and as Section 6104 allows amendments at any 
stage and should be liberally construed, that the defendant was 
entitled, by amendment, to raise a question of jurisc}iction, al-
though such right had been waived by him by failure to raise it 
at the proper time; and, · 
2. The further contention that the facts disclosing· that the 
cause of action arose in Dan,ille and not in Franklin Oounty 
were not discovered by the defendant until after it had appeared 
and plead in bar. 
It is fundamental and hornbook law that the right of amend-
ment does not apply to pleas in abatement. Pleas in abatement 
must be perfect and certain to all extents at the time filed, and 
the law is so strict that special demurrers still lie to pleas in 
abatement (Burks' Pleading and Prac·tice;, 2nd Ed~, p, 260.) 
Furthermore, under no stretch of the imagination can amended 
grounds of defense which attack the jurisdiction of the court 
and a motion to dismiss on the same ground. be construed as 
amendments to former pleadings which fail to attack the juris-
diction of the court. If after he has filed a plea of the general 
issue and grounds of defen::;e, defendant could amend by alleging 
another ground of defense questioning the jurisdiction of the· 
court, then Section 6105 would be a mere nullity, for it expressly 
pro~ides that the jurisdiction cannot be attacked except by plea 
in abatement and that such plea, or nny other plea in abatement, 
must be filed before the defendant has pleaded in bar, etc. The 
result of appellant's attempted construction of Section 6104 is to 
nullify and disregard both Sections 6105 and 4046 of the Oode, 
above quoted, and iB in the teeth of every- decision in Virginia 
on the su l>ject. 
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There is no saving clause in Section ~105 or 4046 for after dis-
covered evidence. The statute is mandatory as to how jurisdic-
tion must be attacked and when it must be attacked. Not for 
nearly a. hundred years has any such attempt been made in Vir-
ginia as is attempted in this action, and since the decision in 
Howard v. Rawson, 2nd Leigh, p. 733, there l1as uerer been a 
doubt or question on the subject. In thut caFe, where it was 
attempted to file a plea in abatement after appearance on the 
ground that it set up after discovered evidence, the court said: 
"The rule in reference to such pl~a is so strict that no example 
can be found of the reception of such a plea after a plea in bar, 
except for matters arising puis darien continuance, although it 
most frequently happens that matters in abatement arising be-
fore suit is brought are discovered after issue joined." 
The action of the trial court therefore in refusing to allow a 
plea in abatement to be filed or to entertain the motion to dis-
miss, or to allow the jurisdiction of the court to he questioned 
by so-called amended grounds of defense was plainly right. 
ALLEGATION OF VENUE 
It is contended tl1at as Oount No. 1 of the notice of motion for 
judgment alleged the publication of the article in the Bee in 
]franklin Uounty, and that as the new~paper was sold by the 
publisher only in the Oity of Danville, that Oount No. 1 in the 
notice, which was for common law libel, should have been strick-
en out and that the article iu question in the Bee should not 
have been given to the jury on Oount No. 1. 
As Oount No. 2 of the notice of motion for judgment declared 
on this same art'icle under the statute of insulting words, and 
as there is no question, and in fact is conceded in plai ntitf's pe-
tition, that publication was unnecessary uncler the count for in-
sulting words, the question is really academic and could have had 
no effect upon the verdict of the jury. For the same article 
going to the jury under the count for insulting words, and being 
admittedly properly before them on that count, it is perfectly 
manifest that so far as the jury was concerned, or their verdict 
is concerned, the result is the same. The conduct and result of 
the trial could not have been affected by the insertion or omis-
sion of Oount No. 1, and therefore, as stated, the following dis-
cussion of the proposition is, we believe, purely academic. 
This count being for libel at common law, it was a transitory 
action. All personal actions, except actions for the recovery of 
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land, are transitory in Virginia. Burks' Pleading a~d Practic~, 
page 65. 
It is conceded law that all allegations which are not traversable 
may be omitted. 
"It is no longer necessary to lay venue in the pleadings in 
purely personal actions nor to aver jurisdiction nor to allege an·y 
action not traversable." 
Burks' Pleading and Practice, 2nd Ed., p. 271, 1st Ed., 287. 
Oode 6081-6082-6083. 
"Actions for personal injury are transitory and it is tulneces-
sary to set forth in the declaration the place at which the act 
was done which caused the injury. That the cause of action 
arose, or the matter is within the jurisdiction of the court need 
not be averred in the declaration. In such actions, objections to 
the jurisdiction of the court must be raised by a plea in abate-
ment." 
Norfolk & Western R. R. Co. v. Ampey, 93 Va., 10~. 
Section 6081 of the Oode expressly provides: 
"It shall not be necssary in any declaration, or other pleading. 
to set forth the place in which any contract was made ~r act 
done, unless when from the nature of the case, the place is. 
material or traversable, etc.'' 
Section 6082 provides: 
Hit Shall not be neCeSSary in any ac~i011 tO aVer tliat the CaUSe 
of action arose, or that the matter is within the jurisdiction of 
the court.'' 
Even under the old practice, where venue was material as giv-
ing jurisdictio.n of trial, it was held ·in Shaner v. White, 6th 
1\'lunford. (20th Va.) 110, that where it was, under the former of 
law, necessary to state where the cause of action arose, or the 
injury was committed, it was permitted to state in the declara-
tion that the place was within the jurisdiction of the court and 
this fiction was not traversable. 
"The only remedy of the defendant is by special appearance 
and objection to the jurisdiction.'' 
Young v. Hart, 101 Va., 480 at 486. 
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But the question has been set at rest in Virginia by the recent 
decision of Moore v. N. & W. R. R. Oo., 124: Va., 628~ opinion by 
Judge Sims. In that case the ·action was brought in the Oircui·t 
Oourt of Oampbell Oounty. It appears that the ca.use of action 
had in fact arisen in the Oity of Lynchburg. The time had 
passed for the defendant to file a plea in abatement. In thut 
case the declaration on it~ face stated that the cause of action 
had arisen in the Oity of Lynchburg. To eliminate this variance 
the plaintiff offered to amend and the trial ·court refused lea're 
so to do. ·The court held, on page 638, that uncler Section 3244 
(bow Section 6082, above quoted) this allegation of the place 
where the act was done, or the cause of a~tion arose. was an un-
necessary averment, quoting N. & W. R. R. Oo. v. Ampey, 93 
Va., 108, and said: uit may therefore be treated as surplusage." 
Petitioner admits the strength of this decision, but u ndert.a.kes 
to minimize it by the claim that the place where the cause of 
action arose might not be material in a railroad aceident case, 
but it might be material in a libel or insulting words proceeding. 
The place not being necessary to be alleged in any event, and 
being therefore not a traversable allegation, it could be omitted, 
and not being traversable could be alleg~d in any place as shown . 
by the above authorities. Sections 6081 and. 6082, as above 
quoted, make no distinction between different forms of personal 
actions, but pro,~ides that in all such actions it is unneeessary to 
allege the place where the act was done, or the cause of action 
arose. It is therefore submitted that in any event the allegation 
in Oount 1 that the libel was published in the Oounty of ]frank-
lin was a non-traversable allegation, was unnecessary, and was, 
as the court said in Moore v. N. &W., supra, ·'mere surplusage." 
Therefore, it was unnecessary to amend tl1e notice of motion and 
the proof admitted in the record was admissible as the notice 
already read. 
There is, however, ~ further reply to the objection to this 
count. 'fhe count alleges that the defendant in said county of 
Franklin did ufalsely compose, publish and print of and concern-
ing the plaintiff in the 'Danville Bee,' a newspaper owned, con-
. trolled, managed, printed and published by the said defendant 
and circulated and distributed by said defendant in the Oounty of 
Franklin, a false, scandalous, etc.,and libelous matter as follows'': 
It is submitted that the evidence in this case shows· that a 
copy of said r1ewspaper so owned, printed and published by the 
defendant, was in fact circulated in Franklin Oounty; that is 
published, as the word is used in slander and libel suits, in 
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Franklin Oounty, and that therefore the allegation in Oount No. 
1 is in fact sustained by the evidence. Petitioner takes the po-
sition that a re-m~i1ing of a defamatory newspaper article is a 
re-publication thereof and that the original publisher is not 
liable therefor. The great majority of courts hold that the au-
thor is liable if the 'l'epetition iB the natural and p1•obable conse-
quence of the communication." 
Petitioner cites no authority except his quotation on pages 14 
and 15 of the decision of Judge Hatcher in Rigney v. Kazee & 
Oo., 139 S. E , 650. An examination of that case shows that the 
quotation relied on was obiter dicta and was not necessary to a 
decision of that case. In the first place, the communication 
therein involved was a letter from an automobile general agent 
to a sub-agent relative to business affairs in which they had a 
mutual interest. It was therefore qualifiedly privileged, that is, 
was privileged in the absence of actual mal~ce on the part of the 
author. rrhis letter was confidential in nature and there was 
nothing which would have led the writer to have supposed that 
it would be shown to a third party. lt was, however, shown by 
. the recipient to a third party. It is necessary to remember that 
the West Virginia court held that the communication was privi-
leged, no malice being shown. It therefore properly held that 
it bein·g privileged between the sender and the addressee, that 
the sender was not responsible for the act of the addressee in 
showing it to a third party. And the court in its syllab~s, which, 
under the 'Vest Virginia statute, is the luw of the case, says: 
HThe author of a libel, qualifiedly p'riviteged, is not responsible 
for its re-publication, unless it appears that he contemplated or 
intended it should be made public.'' 
The distinction and ditJ'erence between the West Virginia 
case and the one at bar is too plain to require further staterilent. 
Therefore, the entire quotation from the West Virginia case is, 
as stated, nothing but obiter dicta. 
There are two lines of decision on the question of responsibil-
ity of the publisher of a libel for its re-publication. rrhere are . 
also two lines of authority as to the re!?ponsibility of the author 
·of a slander for its repetition. The early English doctrine, and 
that of the earlier courts in America, was applied principally to 
cases of slander, and in those cases it was held that the author of 
a slander was not liable for its repetition, and assigned three rea-
sons: (1) .that the author was not responsible for the independent 
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act of a third party in repeating the slander; (2) that to hold the 
author liable would violate the hearsay evidence rule; and (3) 
the very remarkable reason that the author of a slander could 
not be held to reasonably contemplate that it would he repeated. 
The last reason is, of course, against all human experience and is 
in the teeth of every day knowledge on the subject, that a slan-
der is always put in circulation for the very purpose of being re-
peated and that it is human nature to repeat ill-repute of others. 
The courts, even in early times, did not apply the same rule with 
the same unanimity to repetition or re-publication of libel. Many 
courfs began to hold that the so called "hearsay'' rule which ex-
cluded repetitions of slander did not apply to libel. In the firs.t 
place, the libel being printed, spoke for itself. and when handed 
about or mailed from place to place it continued to be the origi-
inal act of the author. Furthermore, the hearsay evidence rule 
did not apply as the libel proved itself, and finally, the last so-
called reason in the slander case did not apply because it did not 
lie in the mouth of the author of a printed or writt.en document 
to deny that this document, which spoke for itself, would pass 
from and to, and be read by, various parties, and that the very 
purpose of publishing printed libel was that it would be, and 
might be, circulated and read by various parties. Accordingly, 
we find the earlier cases more or less divided on the proposition, 
the majority holding that in slander the ol'iginal author was not 
liable for a repetition and probably a m.tj01·ity holding that this 
rule did not apply in libel and that the original publisher was li-
able. In fact, practically all courts, as to libel, holJ that if the 
repetition or circulation of the libel was a fact which the author 
might reasonably have been able to foresee, contemplate, or 
intend; that he was liable for its re-publication by such circula-
tion in whatever place and to whomsoever Emch circulation or 
re-publication was given. Acc~n·Jin~ly, w .~ fi .1 1 th~ la\V laid 
d.own by Newell on Slander and Libel ami quoted in appellant's 
petition as follows: 
"There is little concord among the decisions on this point. A 
few courts flatly held that the author of a libel is not responsible 
for its unauthorized repetition; others hold the author liable if 
the repetition is the natu1•al and p1•obahle consequence of the com-
1JZ.unication.'' 
The question is an open one in Virginia and we believe that 
the statement of Newell above is a fair statement of the present 
hold i.ng of the courts on this sn bject. The authorities are col-
,-----
• 
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lected in a Note to 16 A. L. R. at p. 26. The courts of Alabama, 
Oalifornia, Illinois, Indiana, ~Iaryland, Massachusetts, Michigan 
and Wisconsin have held that the author of a libel is not respon-
sible for its volui1tary and unauthorized repetition. ·The Massa-
chusetts decision is rendered less binding by reason of the fact 
that it is in conflict with a well considered former opinion of· the 
same court. In the majority of these cases the facts showed that 
there was no reason that the author should have contemplated a 
repetition, or re-circulation or re-publication of the libel. 
The following courts have held the author of the libel to be 
responsible for its repetition by another as the natural and prob-
able consequence of the publication. United States, Georgia., 
.Maine, Massachusetts, .Minnesota, Nebraska. New Jersey. and 
Ohio. rrhe cases cannot be reconciled and the decision must, we 
believe, rest in each case upon the particular facts in the case, 
and we can cite no better exawples of the two extremes tl1an the 
West Virginia case already referred to, where the author wa~ 
held not liable, and the case at bar. In the late case o,f Maytag 
v. Ou.mmings, 260 Fed. 74, 16 A. L. R. 71:l, at page 717, the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, (Judge Sanborn,) which was one of slan-
der, distinguished it from a case of libel and said: 
u But the approximate cause of such damages is the illegal in-
tervening repetition, or the maldng by persons of the current re-
ports and rumors which turn aside the natural sequence of events . 
and isolate the damages from the unauthorized repetitior~ from 
those from the original slander. Again, a slander is preserved in 
no standard or fixed form. It .ordinarily so'on fades out and is 
forgotten like the sound that carries it. But one who publishes 
a libel in a newspaper, or pamphlet, which circulates among 
many p_eople, or even in a private letter, thereby places it in·per-
manent form where it will be more likely to continue. in exist-
ence and to be read by many people, .and where he caus·es it to 
be published in a newspaper or magazine he thereby evidences 
his intention that the readers shall read it, sd that the natural 
or probable effect of publishing a libel is far more permanent, 
extensive and injurious, to the victim than the mere speaking of' 
the words it contains to one or more persons. These striking dif-
ferences in the line between mate.rial and immaterial evidence 
in actions of libel and slander, and in the difference between the 
natural and probable consequences of them, are evidenced in the 
decision of the courts and in the text books." · 
"Thus, Odgers in his 5th edition of his work on Slander and 
. Libel, at page 177, states the distinction in this way: 'If I am 
I 
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in any way concerned in the making or publishilig of a libel, I 
am liable for all the damages that ensue to the plai~1tiff from its 
publication. But if I slander A, I am only liable for such dama-
ges as result directly from the one utterance from my own lips. 
If B hears me and chooses to repeat the tale, that is B·s own net 
and B alone is answerable should damages to A eusne.' '' 
"Ne\\:ell, in the 3rd edition of his book on Slunder nnd Libel, 
states the rule on that subject in actions for libel and the marked 
difference between that rule and the rule in actions fm· slander 
in the same terms." 
In the same opinion Ohief Justice Stone, concurring as to the 
rule in libel, goes further and holds that the same rule ~hould 
apply to slander, assigning the reasons for his opinion a8 hereto-
fore set out above in this brief~ ar1d while the opinion is too long 
to copy, the attention of the court iP. respectfully called to pages 
723-725 of the ease as reported in 16 A. L. R. 
We therefore believe .that an examination of the authorities 
and t.ext writers on the subject will show that by the great 
weight of authority, and certainly by the ·overwhelming weight 
of reason, the true rule is that the publisher, author, or printer 
of a libel is liable for its circulation, repetition or re-publication, 
wherever from the character of the publication and the surround-
ing facts and circumstances, it is reasonable to suppose that s~ch 
author, printer or publisher must have have known, intended·, or 
had reasonable cause to believe that such re-publication and 
circulation would probably occur. It is therefore pertinent to 
see what the facts were in reference to the pn blication in question 
- as stated by the defendant and publisher himself, Rorer A. 
James, Jr., on pages 58 and ~9 of the record: 
Q. What do you do with that home edition? How is it disposed 
of? 
A. lt is disposed of by the newsboys mostly. 
Q. It is placed on the news stands, too, _isn't it, at the hotels? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. It is sold at the trains, isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it is carried by the news boys to the public at the 
hotels and trains and sold on the streets to anybody who will 
·buy it? r · 
. i A. ·We sell our newspapers at the door to the news boy~. 
Q. ·Of course, that is the way all papers sell their papers, the 
boys have to put up their pennies before they can get the papers. 
--------1 
r----------------------
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A. Not all. 
Q. But that is the way you do business? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you know that the boys are going to tal{e them on 
the street and sell them on the street to anybody who will buy 
tl1em? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You know they take them to the trains and sell them 
to the traveling public? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they take them to the hotels and sell them to the 
traveling public and you know that the traveling public will buy 
them'l 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you know after you turn an article loose, you· }{now 
after you do it, it is liable to go anywlte1•e in tlte United States? 
A. Yes, si1•, ce1•tainly. 
Q. It rnigh.t go into Jfiranklin Coutty, ~ugusta Oounty or tl 
Norfolk or any other county in the State? 
A .. Yes, sir .. 
Now, the court will take notice of the fact that Franklin 
Oounty adjoins Pittsylvania Oounty, of which D~nville Oity is 
the metropolis.· It is public kuowledge also that Danville is the 
shopping and market center for a large portion of Franklin 
Oounty, connected with it by one of the new improved State high:-
ways. Rorer knew, just as the court and everybody else knows, 
that hundreds of Franklin Oounty peopl_e are on the streets of 
Danville day after day, and that in all probability the evening 
edition, or home edition, of the H Dan ville Bee," which was sold 
on the trains and on the streets and in the hotels and to the 
traveling public, would be solcl to Franklin Oounty people and 
carried by them into Franklin Oounty, or mailed by them to in-
terested parties in :Franklin Oonnty. He admits himself that lie 
knew this, and knew that when he turned this libel loose that it 
might go into Franklin Oouuty or any other county in the State. 
It if therefore confidently submitted that what happened was the 
natural and probable thing which would happen under the cir-
cumstances, and that is that a man in Danville, acquainted with 
the plaintiff in this case, and with friends or relatives in Frank-
liu Oounty, would mail a copy of the paper to such friend or rel-
ative in Franklin Oounty. Therefore it was nothing more than 
what the defendant rPasonably and probably must and should 
have contemplated, that the very article in question would in 
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fact be mailed to Franklin County. This was no intervening act 
of a wrongdoer, it was merely the transmis~ion of a public libel 
to the very place where the article in question would be of most 
interest. 
While the general points referred to in t.he authorities above, 
and particularly the note to 16 A. L. R., 7~6, and following, up-
ply the principle which we believe appli<~ahle in this case, and us 
stated in Schmuck v. Hill, 2 Neb. 79, 96 N. \V. 15S: Hthe rule is 
that one who puts a libel in circulation is liable for any subse-
quent publications "ihich are the natural cousequences of his 
act." The case of Zeer v. Hofflin, 63 A. R. p. 9, 2l N. 'V. 862, 
seems to be expressly in point: 
u\Vhere one publishes a libel in a newspaper, and without his 
knowledge a third person cuts the libel from the paper and sends 
it to some other person, the first is responsible for its being so 
sAnt, if the sending· of it was a natural consequPnce of its pu bli-
cation in the newspaper." 
As stated in Bigby ~. National Fidelity Oo. 50 L. R. A. 1040 
144, N. W. 810. 
HOne who publishes a libel is responsible for such distributions 
and general circulation thereof as is the natural result of his act, 
such as under the circumstances he might reasonably suppose 
would follow as a result of the publication." 
HAnd in Elmer v. Orane, 118 Me. 621, 107 Atl. 852,it .was held: 
'•""vve hold that the defendant is responsible for such repetitions 
of the libel, and such publication, as are fairly within the con-
templation of the original publication and are the natural conse-
quences of it." 
If therefore the mailing of this article into :Franklin county 
was such a natural and probable result of its publication, then 
the author and publisher of the libel is liable in Franklin county 
for such re-publication, and the allegation in count One of its 
publication and circulation in Franklin county is sustained by the 
evidence. 
This rule of law is thus stated in 36 Oyc, p. 1230: 
"The author of the defamation is liable for any secondary pub-
lication which is the natural consequence of his act, and this rule 
applies both to libel and slander." 
In the Note in Ann. Oas. 1916-E at page 909, the author, after 
r 
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stating the general rule that the publisher or originator of a libel 
or slander is not liable for unauthorized re-publications, states 
the further rule on the subject as follows: 
"Limitations of nele. In qualification of the general rule it 
has been held that the repetition or re-publication by others of 
defamatory words, may, under some circumstances, be the nat-
ural and probable consequence of the original act of uttering or 
publishing the libel or slander, in which ·case the author is liable 
for the damages resulting therefrom." 
Oiting Berry v. Hanley, 16 L. T. N. S. (eng.) 263; Merchants 
Ins. Oo. v. Buckner, 98 Fed. 222; Davis v. Starrett, 97 Me. 568, 
55 Atl. 516, Miller v. Butler (Mass.) 52 Am. Dec, 768. Zyer v. 
Hofflin, 58 A. R. 9, Schmuck v. Bill, 96 N. W. 158, Fitzgerald v. 
Young, 182 N. W. 127, Bigby v. Nat. Fid. Oo. 144 N. W. 810, S. 
W. Telephone Oo. v. Long, 108 (Texas) 183 S. W. 421, Ooffin v. 
Brown (Md.) 89 Am. State Report, 422, Gough v. Goldsmith 
(Wise.) 28 A. R. 579. 
The above question as to the publication and circulation in 
-Franklin Oounty is admittedly addressed only to the first count, 
to-wit, the count on common law libel for the article in the 
"Bee." Petitioner admits, page 12 of the record, that Hunder 
that statute (statute of insulting words) where. no publication in 
its technical sense is necessary' and where the damages are based 
me.rely upon the insult and humiliation suffered by the complain..: 
ant himself, the place of publication may be less material." It 
is admitted law that under the statute of insulting words, no 
publication need he alleged or proved and in the notice of motion 
for judgment t·he same article in the HBee'' was declared on in 
count 2 under f:laid statute. See Hines v. Gravin, 186 Va. 818, 
Davis v. Heflin, 130 Va. 169. Therefore under the second count, 
which was on the same article, the allegation as to the place of 
publication was entirely irrelevant and immat~rial, was not nec-
essary to be made, was not traversable, and as petitioiler admits. 
the count was good and the proof was receivable thereunder. It 
is therefore a purely moot question and of no importance in this 
case whether count 1 was for, the purpose of the admission of 
this article before the jury, good or bad, because under count 2 
the same article was admittedly properly introduced before the 
jury and the rejection of count 1 as a count, or the excluding of 
the article in question under count 1 could ha,--e no effect what-
ever upon the conduct of the trial, the amount of damages to 
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which plaintiff was entitled, nor the verdict of the jury therein 
rendered. 
DEMURRER 
The demurrer and grounds th~reof are. found on page 47 of the 
record. The demurrer is to only the third and fourth counts, 
which are the counts declaring on the article appearing in the 
44Dan~ille Register," which article is set out on pages 28 and 80, 
and also on page 47, of the record. The grounds of the demurrer 
are: 
As to the third count, that the publication alleged therein is 
not sufficient to support an action for libel at common law in th~t 
it.sho.ws on its face that it is not a mali(1ions defamation intended 
to impeach the. honesty, integrity or reputation of the plaintiff, 
nor does said count allege such a publication as would be action-
able at commom law. 
As to the fo~rth count the ground of demurrer is that the pub-
lication alleged is not one tending to violence or breach of the 
peace, etc. . 
Petitioner, on page 11 of the record, concedes that the demur-
rer to the fourth count, which was a count under the statute of. 
insulting words, was p-roperly overruled. This necessarily is true 
as the count is plainly one on insulting words and the statute it-
self, section· 5781, provides: 
~·No demurrer shall preclude a jury from passing thereon." 
Citation of authority would be superfluous. 
Petitioner in arguing the demurrer on puge 10 of the petition 
and record,- takes the position that the statements in the article 
'in question referred only to Perdue and only referred to what 
was contended, or claimed by the Commonwealth as to Perdue. 
It should be rem em be red that Powell and Perd ne were arrested 
under a joint warrant and were indicted under a joint indict-
ment and that when they were put to trial on the joint indict-
ment they severed, Perdue being tried first. It is to be remem-
bered that according to the article ibelf the facts in the two 
cases were identical and that the Commonwealth agreed and the 
court ruled that th•e two cases being identical that an acqui~tal 
in the Perdue case automatically acquitted Powell. It is to be 
recalled that both men are charged with a ·joint murder of Ooley 
Godfrey. 'rhat both were charged with having shot Godfrey as 
a joint enterprise, that whatever the reason that either had for 
-~-----, 
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the actual shooting, was necessarily the reason and motive of the 
other. The article in question states, and the notice of motion 
for judgment recites it as stating, p. 49 of the record: HThe ver-
dict of acquittal automatically clears A. H. Powell, jointly 
ol~a'rged with the killing. Judge Dillard ruling that as the evi-
dence in both cases was identical it would not be necessary to 
try Powell. The Oommonwealth contending that Godfrey was 
shot with 'l'obbe'I'Y as the motive." 
The fair interpretation and meaning of this article, and one 
that would necessarily und prop~rly oe dra,'\·n by anyoite reading 
the same, was that in a trial of one of two jointly charged de-
fendants, it was contended by the Commonwealth that the evi-
dence showed, and that the Commonwealth claimed, that in this 
murder robbery was the motive. Not the m·otive of Perdue, but 
the motive of both Powell and Perdue. Every line of the article 
in question conveys the plain idea ·that the contention of the 
Commonwealth and the evidence in the case were identical and 
equally applicable to both Powell and P~rdue. Can it be con-
ceived that anyone in reading the article could have imagined 
that the Oommonwealth would have contended in the trial of 
Perdue that he, Perdue, shot Godfrey, and that the motive was 
robbery, and that Powell shot Godfrey but that robbery was not 
his motive; and not have u ndet·stood from the article that the 
Commonwealth contended in the trial of Perdue that Powell, not 
th~n on trial, as well as Perdue then actually on trial, had com-
mitted the act in question with the same motive? Certainly the 
article bars no such reasonable interpretation and certainly the 
paper: made no differentiation between Powell and Perdue as is 
now claiQJed. 
It is elementary law that to accuse a person of robbery, or of 
attempted robbery, is libelous and actionable per se. Gilmer v. 
Osborne, 142 Va. 262. Moss v. Howard, 102 Va. 386, Harmon v. 
Oundiff, 82 Va. 239, 17 R .. C. L. Sec. 5, p. 265. 
~~A false publication charging that one has been arrested for a 
crime appears to be covered by the same principles 'as deliberate 
ac_cusations of crime, and hence is libelous per se, as is also a 
charge that a person has been indicted for crime .• , 
17 R. 0. L. p. 267. 
HWords charging an attempt to commit a crim~, where such 
crime is a felony or otherwise, are libelous per se." 
Newell on Slander and Libel, p. 154. 
Hit is not necessary, to constitute a libel, that the charge 
should be mad~ in direct and positive terms, or that the charge 
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should be made directly and in so many words, but it is sufficient 
if from the language used the reasonable conclusion and infer-
ence should be drawn by the reader that the party has been ac-
cused of acts which are crimes, or otherwise fall within the defi-
nitions of libel.'' 
"It is sufficient to CQnstitute a libel that the language tends to 
injure the reputation of the party, to throw contumely, or to re-
flect shame and disgrace upon him, or to hold him up as an object 
of scandal, ridicule and contempt; and it is not necessary ·that 
the writing should contain an imputation of an oft'ense which may 
be indicted or punished; and p1•oviding the meaning i8 clear, it is 
not necessary that th.e libelous utte1•ance be in th.e fm·m of positive 
asse1•tiona, but it is equally libelous if they are in the form of in-
~inuations." 
Adams v. Lawson, 17 Gratt. 250, Ohaffin Y. Lynch, 83 Va. 106, 
4th Minor's lnst. (4th Ed.) 470-471. 
Petitioner submits no .authority to sustain his contention that 
the article in the "Register" does not plainly come within the 
definitions and rulings of the court as to ~tatements libelous per 
se, and on the contrary, when· the plain intent and meaning of 
the article is considered by 'the court and it is viewed in ·theJight 
of the other statements in the article itself and facts admitted, 
it is perfectly manifest that the court could i1ot have said, as ·a 
matter of law, that the article was not defamatory of the Ap-
pellee, plaintiff below, and we submit that the court therefore 
properly overruled th~ demurrer. 
uTo publish that a person is accused of a crime is libelous per 
se. And to publish that a person is accused of, or is claimed ·to 
be guilty of a crime different in kind or character from the· crime 
with which he is in fact accused, is libelous per se." 
This principle is established in Virginia in the case of Norfolk 
Post v. Wright, 140, Va., 735. In that case, Wright was arrest-
ed, charged with robbery in River View, un adjoining suburb 
to Oolonial Place. The reporter, claiming that he got the infor-
mation from the city detective, published an article in which it 
was stated "man held in Oolonial Place robberies." The court 
held that this was libelous as a. matter of law and that the plain-
tiff, Wright, was entitled to recover from the. newspaper there~ 
for. The court says : 
uThat the statement made is not in exact accord, with the 
'- facts admits of no dispute. Wright was arrested for house-
----1 
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breaking in Rh·er View. He was held for that crime and at his 
trial Colonial Place was not even mentioned. The character of 
the charge is a matter of public record, and had the reporter 
seen fit to examine it rather than to rely upon· the statement of 
the detective, this litigation could never have arisen. The ver-
dict is not without evidence to support·it and so this assignment 
is overruled." 
Further the court says : 
uMr. Ohase, the reporter, who :was the author of the article, 
testified that the article but re-states, and _accurately states, the 
information the detective gave him. The coriJ•ectnea.¥ of this in-
formation was a 'risk assumed.'' 
17 R. 0. L., p. 846. states the rule: 
ult is observed that the privilege accorded the newspapers to 
publish court records, does not justify a; paper in charging a, 
party to such records with criminal oft'enses and the violations of 
law othe1• than those which a1•e t1•eated in the record." 
And so it has been universally held, as it was in the Virginia 
case of Norfolk Post v. Wright, that for a newspaper to ·publish 
that a person is charged or suspected of a different kind of crime, 
or of a crime in any other place, or under any other circumstan-
. ces from that with which he is in fact charged in the record, is 
libelous, and that the paper is liable therefor . 
. The rule has been applied in a number of cases, among others 
in: 
Flues v. Nonpareil Co. Ann. Oas. 1915-.A, p. 83; Atlantic News 
v. Medlock, 51 S. E. 756, which was an erroneous report of alleged 
remarks of counsel; Vioca v. Landfried, Ann. Cas.1918-0, p. 1198, 
which was an incorrect report of statements claimed to have been 
made by the prosecuting attorney; Sweet v. Post Pub. Co. 
(Mass.) Ann. Oas. 1914-D., p. 533. 
See in accord, Odgers on Libel, pages 246-247. 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTIONS 
lnst'l·uction lYo. 1. 
· This instruction lays down the following propositions of law: 
(a) That newspapers have no peculiar privileges, but are lia-
ble for defamatory matter published, in the same manner as the 
rest~Qf the community. 
Rorer A. James, Jr., v. Allen H. Powell · 27 
(b) That though published in good faith and honest belief in 
its truth, same is not privileged unless in fact true. 
(c) That a paper in publishing defamatory statements takes 
the risk of their information being correct. 
Every principle announced in this instruction was settled by 
the decision of this court, opinion of Judge Keith, in Williams v. 
Saunders, 113 Va. p. 156, in which instructions em bodied the 
very ideas above set out were given. The first instruction given 
in that ease and approved by the court, see 113 Va. p. 161, is as 
follows: 
"The court instructs the jury that proprietors and printers of 
periodicals are just as liable for what they print and publish as 
any other person. They are liable in the same manner and to 
the same extent." 
In discussing this, Judge Keith says, on page 178: 
.. The press has no peculiar privilege. It does not matter by 
whom the report is published, the privilege is the same, as a 
matter of law;'for a private individual as for a newspaper." 
Quoting Newell on Slander, page 5~2, further, Judge Keith 
says: . 
"Liberty of the press is not license, and newspapers have no 
privilege to publish falsehoods or to 'defame under the guise of 
giving the news. It is held that the press occupies no better po-
sition than private persons publishing the same matter; that it 
is subject to the law, and if it defames it must answer for it.'' 
In the same opinion, p. 180, in answer to the defense made that 
the article was published in good faith and in an honest belief of 
of its truth, Judge Keith says that such fact, even if it exists, is 
no answer to liability of a newspaper in publishing false defam-
atory matter, and says : 
"In such case it is not sufficient to prove that the party pub-
lishing had good reason to believe, and did believe, them to be 
true, as a publication of this character is not even conditionally 
privileged. ·From the publication of such libelous charges the 
law implies malice, as well as damages to the plaintiff; and the 
jury may therefore, on proof of the pu blieation only, render a 
verdict for substantial damages." 
Furthermore, the same question exactly was before the court 
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-in Norfolk Post Oo. v. Wright, 140 Va., 735. In that case the de-
fense was made that the author of the article had received the 
information from the city detective and that he honestly be-
lieved it to be true. The court said that this- was no defense 
and stated, pag~ 788: 
"The correctness of this information was a risk assumed.'' 
In the case of Burt v. Adv. News Oo. (Mass.) 13 L. R. A., 97, 
cited in the Norfolk Post case, supra, it was held, on page 101, 
(s~e syllabus -3) : 
uThe honest belief in the truth of the statements is no 
defense." 
"Defamatory matter published in good faith, in the honest be-
lief of its trutlt, if false, is not privileged because published as a 
mere matter of news.'' 
36 Oorpus Juris, p. 1272. citing authority from U. S. Oourts, 
and 19 Htate Supreme Oourts. 
Th~ question of belief or intention is never material in actions 
of libel unless: (a) Punitive damages ·are sought for actual mal-
ice; or (b) The publication is qualifiedly privileged, in which 
case it is necessary to show bad intention or actual malice. 
Where the publication is not e\"en qualifiedly privileged, as will 
be demonstrated here, the question of intent or malice being im-
material, the fact there was an honest belief in the truth of the 
libel is no defense. 
~=.Newell on Slander and Libel, p. 891, SP-ction 381, 17 R. 0. L., 
p. 822, 823 and the Virginia and other cases allove cited. 
· NO PRIVILEGE, EVEN QUALIFIED, UNLESS 
REPORT OORREOT 
~newspaper report of judicial proceedings is not privileged 
unless the report is in fact true. That is say, that unless the re-
port isa fair and accurate account of what in fact transpired at the 
trial, or of 'Yhat the accused is in fact accused, the publication 
i~ not privileged. Newell on Slander and Libel, 4th Ed., p. 498, 
(quoted in Appellant's petition on page 19) Jays down the rule 
as follows : · 
4
•The report tnust be an in partial and acou1•ate aooount of what 
1'eally ocou1'1'ed at the t1·ial, oth.e1•wise, no p1•ivilege will attach." 
17 R. 0. L. Section 91, p. 344, lays down the rule as follows: 
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u To be pt/•ivileued a 'l'epm·t m.~tst he fai1•, impa'J•tial and acC?.t'J'ate. 
By tkia statement is meant rne'l·ely that a 'J'epo'l't of judicial P"'O-
eeedings must he cm''J'e(~t '' 
'For this qualified privilege to exist, as stated in 36 Oorpus Ju-
ris, 12i3: 
uThe publication must contain only that which happened in 
the due course of the proceedings, and any matter added thereto 
by the publisher defamatm·y to the plaintiff' is not privileged, 
although the puhlication is made i'IZ good faitlt O'l' with 'J'easonable 
cause to believe it to he t'l'ue. '' 
E,urther, on page 1~7!, the same authority says: 
"The report must present justly and fairly an impartial ac-
count of the proceeding~. It must also be accurate at least in 
rega.rd to all material matters. In short, the report must ·be 
characterized by fairmindedness, honesty and accuracy.,, 
In the case of Atlantic News Oo. v. Medlock, 51 S. E. 756, cited 
in Note 76-A on page 1274 of 36 Oorpus Juris, this rule was ap-
plied in regard to alleged statements reported to have b~en made 
by counsel which were not in fact made and the publisher was 
held liable. The same situation has ar.isen and been. applied in 
other cases already cited in t.his brief. In the Notes, the same 
authority, will be found a number of instances where the publi-
cation charged that the plaintiff had been accused of or charged 
with some criminal offense different ft·om the true facts, although 
they had been in fact arrested and charged with some different 
offense. In every case, this erroneous statement of a newspaper 
has been held per se libelous. And in the recent Virginia case 
of Norfolk Post Oo. v. Wright, this very qu~stion was involved 
and was decided in accordance with the authorities above set 
forth. 
No authority is cited in appellant's petition, and none c~n be 
found, to sustain petitioner's remarkable position that au article 
which purports to be a report of a judicial proceeding is privi~ 
leged whether the statements therein co·ntained are true and 
correct reports of such proceeding, or not. Such cla:im is in the 
teeth of every authority, including those cited by the appellant 
in his own brief. 
That the paper takes this risk of the information on which his 
report is based being correct is sustained by the foregoing au-
thorities and is expressly so held· in Williams v. Saunders, 118 
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Va., 156, and Norfolk Post v. Wright, 140 Va., 735. 
Inst'I'Uction 3. (Page. 40 of the record.) 
The only objection urged to this instruction aside from the 
same objections urged to ltistruction No. 1, which have· already 
been argued, are (1) That neither malice nor damage can be im-
plied from the publication of a report of judicial proceedings, al-
though the criminal charges against him may have been libelous 
per se. 
Of course, this proposition of law is perfectly sound, and if 
Powell had been by the warrant or indictment in fact charged 
with robbery, or if the Commonwealth's Attorney had in fact 
claimed tha~ he had committed murder for the pui·pose of rob-
bery, there would have been no liability on the publisher for pub-
lishing these facts. As stated, a correct and accurate report of 
what occurs in judicial proceedings. is qualifiedly privileged. 
That is, is privileged if no actual maiice exists. But this is 
no.~ th(;} case at bar, nor did Instruction No. 3 make any such 
claim. In~trriction No.3 laid down the proposition that the pub-
lieation that a person has committed,_or is~harged \vith,robbery, 
or the attempt to commi.t robbery, is libelous per se and further 
instructed the jury that the law presumerl damages to result from 
the utterat~ce or publication of words-libelous per se or insulting 
words. 
As to the objection to Instruction No. 3 that neither malice 
nor damage can be i~plied from the publication of a libel the 
following authoritie~ settle the proposition: 
Jordon v. Melville Shoe Oo 150 Va. 101, H.amsey ~. Harrison 
119 Va. 682, Williams v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156, Boyd v. Boyd, 
116 Va. 326. 
In Jordon v. Melville Shoe Corporation, supra, the court, Judge 
Ohichester speaking, says, p. 105: · 
uEv.en if plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages, he is en-
titled to compensatory damages without any evidence on his be-
half showing actual or pecuniary loss." 
"So far as the present question is concerned, it is perfectly 
well settled that in insulting language cases· no actual damages 
have to be proved in order to recover substantial compensatory 
damages. The law implies damage from the speaking of insult-
ing words.'' 
"Thus in Williams P. Oo. v. Saunde.rs, a libel case, 113 Va., p. 
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156, at p. 180, it is said 'from the publication of such Hbelous 
charges the law implies malice .as well as damages to the plain-
tiff, and the jury may therefore, on proof of the publication alone~ 
render a verdict for substantial damages~ l " 
"In Ramsey v. Harrison, 119 Va~, 682, a caEe of insulting 
words, the following instruction was approved by the court: 
'The court instructs the jury that the law presumes that dam-
ages result from the utteranc·e of insulting words, and it is not 
.. neces~ary for the piaintiff to prove either actual or pecuniary 
loss in order to recover.' " 
"The opinion at p. 707, quotes from Boyd v. Boyd, 116 Va., 
326, as follows: • 
'The law presumes that damages result from the utterance of 
insulting words, made actionable by our statute, just as it does 
where the words uttered are actionable per se, and it is not nec-
essary in either case, in O'rde1• to recover, to p1•ove actual or pecun-
ia'l·y loss} " 
The instrnction aboYe given is practically verbatim the· in .. 
struction approved_in the above case. 
The second objection to Instruction 3 is th~t the publication· 
was not only privileged by reason of the judicial proceeding 
"which it purported to report" but also because the publisher of 
a newspaper owes the people a duty and has ·a common interest 
with the pu~lic and the readers of his newspaper in the report-
ing of judicial proceedings, etc.- The first portion of' this ·objec-
tion is fully co\'ered by the authorities above cited·. _:~That the 
case was not privileged unless the report was in fact. true and 
accurate must be conce4ed. That as it was not privileged then 
malice is presumed is settled by all the authorities. Among 
others: 
Tyree v. Harrison, 100 Va., 540. 
Strode v. Clement, 90 Va., 553. 
Brown v. N. & W., 100 Va., 619. 
Farley v. Thalheimer, 103 Va., 504.-
Williams v. Saunders, 13 Va., at p. 176. 
As to the other proposition, we believe that the 'Opinion. of 
Judge Keith in Williams v. Saunders, 113 V a., at p. 178, settles 
th'is matter : 
"The paper has no exclusive privilege, it does not matter by 
whom the report is published the privilege is the same as a mat-
ter of law for a private individual as for a newspaper." 
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uA proprietor·of·a newspaper is liable for a libel published in 
his paper though published in his absence and without his 
knowledge by an agent to whom he has given expre~s instruction 
to publish nothing exceptional, personal or abusive." 
Dull. v. Hall, 1 Ind. 344:, Orane v. Bennet, 177 N. Y ., 106. 
Newell on Slander and Libel, says, p. 723, Section 714: 
uThe right to publish tl;rough the newspapers, such matters of 
interest as may be properly laid before the pu hlic, does not go 
to the extent of allowing the publication concerning a person, of 
false and defamatory matter, there being no other reason or jus-
tification for so doing than the mere publication of the newR. 
But false assertions when they impute the com ~ission of crime, 
are actionable; and when not based upon any fact legally tender-
ed to prove the crime imputed, then publication cannot he said 
to be privileged. It will not do to say that such a publication 
was made with reasonable care, however goorl the moti \'e may 
have been. The public welfare never requires any such reckless 
disregard of the sacred· rights of the enjoyment of a pure unci 
spotless reputation, which uo amount of property can command, 
anc.l which it often takes its possessor a lifetime to procure." 
17 R. 0. L. P. 349, says: 
'~The general rule independent of ~tatute is that a newspaper 
has no more right than a private individual has to trifle with the 
reputation of any citizen by carelessness or rPckle8sness to injure 
his good name or business without answering therefor in damages. 
Proprietors·of.newspapers have the right to publish the truth, but 
they hav:e not rigbt to publish falsehood to the injury of others." 
. . ·' 
See to the same effect, 36 Oorpus Juris, p. 1271, where it is 
said: 
u It is well-settlecl that in th~ absence of statute newspape-rs 
as such have no peculiar privileges, but are liable for what they 
publish in the same manner as the rest of the community. Def-
famatory matter published in goorl faith in the hone~t belief in 
its truth, if false, is not privileged because published as a mere 
matter of news. These rules are not inconsistent \Vith ~the lib-
erty of the press' as this right is· recognized in Englund and 
guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions of this 
country." 
In the following notes to this authority, found on p. 1272, are 
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two leading cases of McAllister v. Detroit Free Press (Mich), 15 
A. S. R. 318 and Reiley v Lee (Ky.) 21 A. S. R. 358, in both of 
which the same attempted claim was made as is set up by appel-
lant here, to-wit, that the press enjoyed some particular right or 
favor of immunity and that because articles would be of interest 
to its readers they were privileged tho' defamato.ry and false. In 
reply the Michigan court says: 
ulf true, such publication may be privileged, but if false, the 
newspaper, as well as the citizen, must be responsible to anyone 
who is wronged or damaged thereby, and no sophistry of reason, 
and no excuse of the demand of the public for news, or of the 
peculiarity and magnitude of -newspaper work can avail to alter 
the law, except, perhaps by positive statute, which is doubtful, 
so as to lea~e a party thus injured without any recompense for 
wrong which can e\'en now, as the law stands, never be ade-
quately compensated to one who loves his reputation better than 
111011ey .. , 
And in answer to the same argument the Kentucky court; in .. 
the above case, says: 
uThe answer is that the presf:l must not be tlte vehicle of .at.;. 
tacks upon the character and reputation of a person unless the .. 
attack is known to be. true, if it is not known to be true, do not 
publish it; the publication can seldom,. if ev~r, do good, and the : 
indulgence in publications of the sort, not strictly true, would 
soon deprave the .. mo~·al taste of society and render it miserable.". 
Instruction 5, (See ·~age 40 of the record.) 
This instruction is ;objected to because it told the jury that no.· 
privilege existed unless tlie charges were i 11 fact true, and no~~_aJ~ ' 
legation of thei~ truth being plead they are conclusively presuine~d · 
to be false, and the co"urt therefore tells the jury that their pub-
lication. was not privileged. · 
It is unquestionably true that whether or not a ·publication is 
privileged is~ as a general proposition, a question of law for the 
court. It is further true that where the question as to whether 
the publication is or is not privileged 4epends upon the facts, and. 
the facts are in dispute the question is for the jury under proper 
instructions of the court. But for it to be a question for the jury 
the facts must be in dispute. We have tlemonstrated that a pur-
ported .report of proceedings at a judicial trial is not privileged 
unless such purported report is substantially true and accurate; : 
that is, that the mere fact that the newspaper purports the arti-
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ele in question to be a report of judicial" proceedings does not 
make it privileged. In the instant case, the notice of motional-
leges that the defendant published an article in two nepspapers 
owned by defendant in which articles certain statements were 
made as to what the appellee was accused of and of what he was 
charged with in said proceedings .. The question of fact therefore 
was not was Powell guilty or not guilty, but the question of fact 
was and is, was he charged by the Commonwealth with robbery 
and did the Commonwealth at the trial contend that he had shot 
Godfrey with robbery as a motive. If appellant had been able· 
to show at the trial, under a plea of truth, that the warrant and 
indictment did charge robbery and that the Oommonwealth at 
the trial had contended that Godfrey was shot with the purpose 
of robbery, then the statement and allegations in the newspaper 
articles would have been true, not true that Powell was guilty, 
but true that the charges and contentions in fact existed as the 
articles alleged. For the defendant below to hu.ve availed him-
self of this defense, to-wit, that Powell was charged with rubbery 
and that the Corrin1onwealth 's Attorney did conten(l that he had 
shot Godfrey with robbery as a motive, it was necessary and 
mandatory that the defendant plead truth, that is plead that the 
statements in the two newspaper articles were true i. e. did fair-
ly and accurately report what occurred at the trial. But the de-
fendant not only did .not avail himself of this plea of truth, but 
admitted by his cotinsel at the trial when the Commonwealth's 
Attorney was put on to prove the falsity of these charges, that 
the statements in the newspaper articles were untrue. We have 
already set out the evidence and statements of counsel for Rorer 
A. James, Jr., found on pages 55 and 56. of the record, and will 
not repeat them again. 
It has been settled law in Virginia since the decision of Wil-
liams v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156, that under section 6240 of the 
Code of 1919 (8375 of the Code of 1887) that the defense of truth 
of the words written or spoke~ cannot be received either in bar 
or in mitigation of damages, unless the truth be specially pleaded. 
Said section is as follows : 
"In any action for defamation the defendant may justify by 
alleging and proving that the words spoken or written were true, 
etc.'' 
This statute applies both to actions at common law for libel 
and slander and to actions under the statute for insulting words. 
In the case of Williams Printing Oompany v. Saunders, 118 Va. 
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the defendant asked for Instruction No. 4,' found on page 159, as 
follows: 
"The publications complained of, having been written and pub-
lished of the plaintiff as a candidate, are privileged publications 
if you believe from the evidence; (1) that the statements therein 
contained were- true, or (2) that although untrue they were nec-
essarily held :from information then in his possession, etc." 
Judge Keith on page 179, says: 
''This instruction No. 4 was properly refused because it left it 
to the jury to say whether or not the· publications were true, 
when there being no plea of justification in the case th.ey are con-
clusively presumed to be false." 
On page 181, in re-stating the conclusihns of the court, Judge 
Keith says: 
"We are- of opinion that the cases and textbooks consulted es-
tablish the following proposition: ( 1) that the truth of defama-
tory words written or spoken cannot be shown under the plea of 
not guilty, but that there must be a plea of justification.'' 
On page 162, in the same case of Williams v. Saunders, 113Va. 
the trial court gave an instruction embracing the very idea ex-
pressed in plaintiff's instruction No. 5 in. the instant case, as fol-
lows: 
"The court further instructs the jury that under the pleading 
and proof .in this case, there being no plea filed .. nor proof offered 
by the defendants that the charges sued on are true, the jury 
must consider that said charges are untrue.'' 
Prentiss, Ohief Justice, in Bragg v. Elmore, decided March 21, 
1929, 147 S. E. 275, at p. 277, says : 
"The rule of law that in the absence of a plea ()f justification 
the truth cannot be shown is of cours.e !perfectly well settled.'' 
And further says, with approval of its action in so doing: 
"The trial court repeatedly told the jury that the libelous 
words in the letter were presumed to be false and gave a11: une-
quivocal written instruction that the charges contained in the 
le.tter and the postscript thereto, were conclusively presumed to 
be false. Under the facts of this case, the plaintiff was entitled 
to this unambiguous and specific pronouncement by the court." 
The petition undertakes by sop_histry of reason to confuse the 
- --- ·--, 
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question of whether Powell was guilty of.certain chb.rges with the 
question as to what charges were n~arle in fact against Powell. 
There is no question here involved as to Powell's innocence or 
guilt, that having been settled in the criminal trial by a verdiet 
of not guilty. The question here is were certain charges in fact 
made against Powell in the warrant, indictment and conduct of. 
the trial. If the charges were made, then the state'ment in the . 
paper that they were made was true and· a plea of truth went, 
not to the question of his innocence or guilt, but to the question 
of whether in fact the charges had been made or contended. 
Therefore, under the case above cited, in the absence of a plea of 
truth the law conclusively presumed that the statements in the 
newspaper that he was so charged were conclusively -false. 
lnst'J•uction 6. (See page 41 of the record.) 
This is an instruction on the measure of damages. This in .. 
struction is copied verbatim from instruction No 7 giveJl in .the 
case of Williams v. Saunders, 113 Va. p. 15(), p. 164, and ap-
proved by the court in that case. It is also the same instruction 
given and approved in Ramsey v. Harrison, 119 Va.,682, lu dis-
cussing this instruction so appl'oved the court says: 
"At the trial of this case the com·tgave nine instructions asked 
by the plaintiff· numbere:l respectively, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 
9. All of the inst1·uctions appear in the official report of the case 
and we do not deem it necessa1·y to comment seriatim upon the 
objections made to the instructions given for the pia i ntiff. TheRe 
instructions embody principles of law \vhich huxe been repeat-
edly sanctioned by this court.'' 
Oiting a long line of Virginia cu,ses, beginning with Dillon v. 
Oollins, :l5 Gratt, 3:1:3, and ex tending thro:.tgh ~,arley v. Thalhei-
mer, 103 Va., 50-J:. 
The court further says: 
uThe law presumes that damage results from the utterance of· 
insulting words made actionable by our statute, just as it does 
where the words uttered are actionable per se, and it is not nec-
essary in either case, in order to recover, to pr~ve actual or pecu-
niary loss." 
The court had jurisdiction over the case both because one of · 
the articles declared on and published in the HDanville Register" 
was admittedly circulated in Franklin county, and because the 
other article in the "Danville Bee", whether circulated in Frank-
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lin county or not (but we insist that the evidence shows that it 
was so circulated) was also declared on under the statute of in-
Rutting words, in which publication was unnecessary, and the 
court having thus general jurisdiction of the cause of action, the 
defendant not having seasonably, by plea in abatement, objected 
thereto. the court and jury could in one case proceed to give the 
entire damages for the E:'ntire cause of action set up in the notice 
of motion for judgment in which the defendant had plead the 
general issue. This instruction as stated has been given both in 
common law libel and ·in insulting word cases and has been fre-
quently approved by the court. rrhe very proposition therein an-
nounced were expressly before the court, and this instruction was 
approved in the recent case of Jordan v. Melville Shoe Oo. 150 
Va. p. 110, which has already been fully quoted from in this 
brief. Furthermore, Instruction ''I'', p. 42 of the record •. offered 
by the defendant below and given by the court is in all effects 
substantially in accord with plaintiff's instruction No. 6 here ob-
jected to. 
DEFENDANT'S INSTROTIONS 
Instructions refused by the court as tendered by the d.efendant 
below presented the opposite theory from those given by the 
plaintiff and the authorities above cited practically cover all of 
the questions of law therein involved. As the court was· correct 
in its ruling in giving the instructions of plaintiff, then the court 
necessarily refused defendant's instructions A, B, K, 0, D, E, F, 
and G. 
In reference to Instruction "0 ", this instruction was otherwise 
-improper for various reasons. It is only necessary to set out the 
following: 
"At common law a retraction was only admissible in mitiga-
tion of punitive or exemplary damages, and as negativing ex-
press or actual malice. 
"If the retraction tends to show absence of malice, and since 
it may be found to have diminished materially the damage caused 
by libel or slander, it is generally admissible in mitigation of 
damages. But a retraction published after suit has been institu-
ted has been held not to mitigate the damages. Moreover, since 
the evidence of retraction is admitted in mitigation of damages 
on the theory that it tends tQ negative the existence of actual 
malice, it follows that such evidence of a retraction can be re-
ceived in mitigation of exemplary damages only." 
17 R. 0. L. Sec. 209, p. 448. 
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Furthermore, for the apology or retraction at common law to 
be admissible it must in fact be an apology and a retraction. The 
article relied on as an apology pu blishecl before suit was brought 
and found on page 63 of the record, and which was published in 
the uDanville Bee" on February .21, 1928, could have no bearing 
upon the publication in the uRegister." In the second pluce, it 
does not pretend to be a retraction or ap0logy, but only pretends 
to be a statement uby Messrs. Dillard and Powell of their side 
of the matter.'' Nowhere does the paper say that the statements 
in its former. publication to the effect that Powell was charged 
with robbery were in fact untrue, it only states that uDillard and 
Powell claimed that they were incorrect." 
"As to the form of a retraction, the rule is that it must be of 
such a nature and published in such a manner as to express an 
honest intention to repair the harm done· to the injured reputa-
tion. The reparation to the defamed person must not be merely 
coJorable. The defendant must admit that the charge was un-
grounded; that it was made without proper inf~wmution, under 
an entit·e misapprehension of the real fa~ts and that he regrets 
that it was published." 17 R. 0. L. Sec. 73 on p. 328. 
In so far as said Instruct.ion ~'0" predicated such apology as in 
ba.r of the action, it was baq for the following reasons: 
1. The statute, 6240, provides· that in uany action for defama-
tion (after.notice in writing of his intention so to do, gh·en to 
plaintiff at the time of, or in pleading to such action) the de-
fendant may give in evid-ence, in mitigation of darnngea, that he 
made or offered an apology to the plaintiff for such defamation,. 
before the commencement of the action, .etc." 'l,herefore, either 
for the action of libel or insulting words, the apology was not ad-
missible in bar, but only in mitigation of damages. 
2.. If it is claimed that the apology was e_xpressly accepted by 
the plaintiff as in full satisfaction, the evi,lence fails to sustain 
the contention because it is testified both by Dillard and Powell 
that not only did the paper agree to prepare, print and publish 
a full apology and retraction, but further agreed to send copies 
thereof to Dillard and Powell, Q.nd this is not denied but in fact. 
admitted by Gerard Tetley, witneE;s for the defendant, on p. 72 
of the record, and nowhere was it testified· that any such copy 
was mailed as agreed, but on the contrary is shown not to have 
been so mailed. '11herefore, it is cleat: that the defendant, Rorer 
A. James, did not live up to his agreement in reference thereto .. 
Therefqre, the publication alone of such article was not bar to 
recovery. 
Rorer A. James, Jr., v. Allen H. ~owell 39 
3. "Under exceptional circumstances~ the retraction of a de-
famatory .publication may he pleaded as a complete defense. 
Thus it has bet:'u held that where slanderous worrls are retracted 
at the time of the speaking of the words, or bt:'fore the separation 
of the persons who heard them, E'uch a retraction is a complete 
defense. A retraction is also a def(·Hlse wh~n made in pursuance 
of an agreement to release the plaintiff's right to recot'er, al-
though a ha1•e eJJpression of satiafaction at an apolom1 and recan-
tation will not ope1•ate to release a 'rlght ot action. However, the 
general rule in actions for libel and slander is that the retraction 
of defamatory language is admissible in evidence only for the 
purpose of mitigation of damages recoverable by the defamed 
person and is not a bar to an action therefor." 17 R. 0. L., Sec. 
72, p. 327. 
4. The alleged retraction appeared only in the "Bee" and 
only applied to the article appearing in the uBee. '' It was not 
published in the uRegister" and had no reference to the "Reg-
ister'' article. As both the article in the "Bee" and the artide 
in the "Register" were sued on in this action, an apology .for the 
"Bee" article would not and could not be a bar to. the action 
and. therefore the instruction which made such apology a defense 
in bar was properly refused. 
As to the other instructions refused, they were in the teeth of 
the law as laid down by all of the authorities and as·set forth in 
this brief and petitioner cites no authority in support thereof. ' 
The eighth assignment of error was to ·the exclusion by the 
co1:1rt of the evidence of Tetley, witness for the defendant, as 
follows: (p. 70-71) 
Q. "In preparing the original.article of November 18th, ·did 
you do so in the honest belief that it truly reported the judicial 
proceeding in the Oircuit Oourt of Franklin Oounty?" 
To which the plaintiff objected, objection sustained and 
defendant excepted. 
We have already set out the line of authorities in Virginia 
"-i· and elsewhere unanimously holding that unless exemplary or 
punitive damages are. claimed that honest belief or honest mis-
take in the truth or falsity of an article published in a· news-
paper is no defense when sued for substantial compensatory 
damages. 1'he court so~ instructed in Williams v. Saunders, 118 
Va., 156, and no authority~here is found to the contrary and 
petitioner cites none. 
In the instant case plaintiff disclaimed any punitive or exem-
plary damages (record p. 60) and on such disclaimer the article 
-- --., 
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appearing in the "Danville Register'' under date of November 
14 was excluded. This article having been introduced. by the 
plaintiff to show that at the time of the publication in question 
the defendant had actual knowledge and information in his files 
of the true facts. It was excluded on motion of the defendant 
on the very theory here advanced, (record pages 65 and 66) that 
unless punitive damages were claimed knowledge or honest be-
lief of the converse were immaterial and the court so ruled. 
The defendant below having in the course of these proceedings 
assumed this position and also having admitted that it was un-
necessary to prove the falsity of the charges, no plea of truth 
having been filed, and having further admitted that the state-
ments in the newspapers were untrue, (see p. 55 and 56 of the 
record) the appellant is estopped now to take inconsistent posi-
tions in this court and is bound by his actions in the court below. ( 
See Oanada v. Busby Bros. 132 Va. 162, Big Vein Ooal Oo. v. 
Browning, 137 Va. 3!, and authorities cited. 
In couclusi9n, and with apologies for the length of this brief, 
we supmit: That the defendant was regularly before the court 
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, plead the gen-
eral issue and was afforded a full and fair trial on the merits, and 
that no error has or can be pointed out by virtue of which de-
fendant was deprived of such fair, full and adequate trial. That 
the amount of damages found by the jury as being uadequate 
compensatory damages" for the libelous and insultiJlg words in 
question, were as to amount peculiarly within the province of 
the jury and that nothing has been or can be alleged to ~how that 
they were excessive or improperly allowed. While it is earnestly 
and sincerely contended that there is no error even technically 
in the record, yet on the whole, under the statut.e and the well 
established decisions of this court, there is in no event prejudi-
cial error of which the defendant can complain. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN B. POWELL, 
DAVIS & DAVIS & HoRACE M. Fox, 
Counsel. 
By Counsel. 
